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NOTES

the other hand, it is generally held that where the communication is sent on request to an interested person, it is qualifiedly
privileged.4
In the opinion of the instant case, however, the court ignored
the question of privilege mentioned in the syllabus and rested the
decision on the basis of negligence. The rule stated was as follows:
"With reference to these companies, the rule is that publishing of a tradesman that he has been sued, if true, is not actionable; but, if untrue, and is owing to negligence, it may give
rise to an action." (Italics supplied.)
The above statement seems to require a finding of negligence.
But, since the communication was sent to subscribers generally,
therefore not privileged, there should have been no necessity to
find negligence. 5
In view of the conflicting language employed in the syllabus
and the opinion, the present status of the Louisiana law cannot
be regarded as settled.6 It is suggested, however, that in subsequent cases Louisiana will follow the prevailing American rule
as stated in the syllabus.
M.D.R.

MINERAL RIGHTS-RECITAL OF OUTSTANDING MINERAL RIGHTS
IN A DEED OF SALE AS A RESERVATION-ERROR OF LAw-The vendor
bank owned certain property which it sold under a deed containing a recitation to the effect that all minerals had been sold from
the tract before acquisition thereof by the vendor, and that therefore they were excluded from the conveyance. However, prescription had run on the mineral servitude, and though the vendor was
ignorant of the fact, the minerals had reverted to its ownership
prior to the sale. Subsequently, the vendee learned of this and
4. Erber and Stickler v. R. G. Dun and Co., 12 Fed. 526 (C.C. Ark. 1882);
Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 Fed. 214 (C.C. Md. 1882); Pollasky v. Mincher, 81
Mich. 280, 46 N.W. 5 (1890); Omsky v. Douglas, 37 N.Y. 477 (1868); Bradstreet
Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S.W. 753, 2 L.R.A. 405 (1888).
5. See Fitzpatrick v. Daily States Publishing Co., 48 La. Ann. 1116, 1135,
20 So. 173, 180 (1896). Cooley, op. cit. supra note 2, at 519, § 149; Prosser, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 815.
6. Where expression in syllabus prepared by the court is modified by
opinion, the opinion must be looked to for the authority of the decision. See

Cabral v. Victor and Provost, 181 La. 139, 146, 158 So. 821, 823 (1934). See also
Burdick v. Ernst, 232 U.S. 162, 165, 34 S.Ct. 299, 301, 58 L.Ed. 551, 554 (1914).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. IV

had an officer of the vendor, who was unaware of the prescription
of the mineral servitude, sign a quit-claim to the mineral rights
for a purported consideration of one dollar. The vendor brings
this action to have the quit-claim declared null and void for want
of consideration. Held, that there was ample consideration (if any
were needed) in the deed. Even though the quit-claim be disregarded, the intention of the vendor was to sell all right and title
which it possessed in the land, and the only purpose of the recitation was to guard against warranty. Therefore, the vendor's
mistake was one of law from which it can get no relief, and the
deed alone has transferred the mineral rights to the vendee.
Commercial National Bank in Shreveport v. Herrick, 3 So. (2d)
449 (La. 1941).
It has frequently been urged that recitations similar to that
in the principal case in deeds of sale constitute acknowledgments
of existing servitudes in such manner as to interrupt prescription' under Article 3520 of the Civil Code.2 The court has, however, with few exceptions,3 refused to allow this contention to
prevail, and has interpreted the recitations as "mere"' acknowledgments of something which the vendor was compelled to notice
and could not deny.5 But a vendor has the right to deal with his
reversionary interest. 6 Therefore the court looks to the intention of
the vendor at the time of sale to determine what dealings with
the reversionary interest were actually contemplated by the
parties.7 In the final analysis, intention is the basis for decision.
If a recitation of outstanding mineral rights is regarded as a reservation, the vendor's so-called "mistake of law"8 would operate
to the prejudice of the vendee.
1. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 149 La. 100, 88 So.
723 (1921); Sellington v. Producers Oil Co., 152 La. 81, 92 So. 742 (1922); Lewis
v. Bodcaw Lumber Co., 167 La. 1067, 120 So. 859 (1929); Louisiana Del Properties, Inc. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 169 La. 1137, 126 So. 684 (1930); Patton
v. Frost Lumber Industries, Inc., 176 La. 916, 147 So. 33 (1933).
2. Art. 3520, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Prescription ceases likewise to run
whenever the debtor, or possessor, makes acknowledgment of the right of
the person whose title they prescribed."
3. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 149 La. 100, 88 So.
723 (1921); Sellington v. Producers Oil Co., 152 La. 81, 92 So. 742 (1922).
4. "Acknowledgment per se, as set forth in Article 3520, does not apply,
having been eliminated by the word 'mere'!" Daggett, Louisiana Mineral
Rights (1939) 63.
.J
5. Lewis v. Bodcaw Lumber Co., 167 La. 1067, 120 So. 859 (1929).
6. Galley v. McFarlain, 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940), noted in (1940) 2
LOUISIANA LAW REvsw 752.

7. Lewis v. Bodcaw Lumber Co., 167 La. 1067, 120 So. 723 (1929); Louisiana Del Oil Properties, Inc. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 169 La. 1137, 126 So.
684 (1930).
8. Art. 1822, La. Civil Code of 1870: "He is under an error of law who
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therefore, require a stretch of the imagination to assume that the
vendee is entitled to more than he was offered, more than he bargained for, more than he paid for, regardless of why it was not
offered to him?
In dealing with that question sight must not be lost of the
fact that the case is not one of dealing with two separate and
distinct estates,"6 but rather with a landed estate upon which a
real right in the nature of a servitude may be imposed. T Unless
that servitude is expressly established, sale of land with no mention whatsoever of the minerals conveys both interests. 8 When
both land and minerals are held by a single owner, the interests
are confused-9 or merged and constitute a single estate. Therefore, a sale of the land includes a sale of the minerals, nothing
to the contrary appearing.
In the principal case, the recitation in the deed should clearly
rebut any presumption that the mineral rights were included in
the sale of the land. If the present interest in the mineral rights
was not bargained for, then no part of the consideration paid for
the land was payment for them. The principal channel through
which consideration might flow is closed, leaving but that portion
of the price which may be said to have been paid for the hope of
acquiring the mineral rights by a subsequent reversion due to
non-use plus the dollar recited in the quit-claim. To maintain
that that is a sufficient consideration is to declare that mineral
0
rights are practically worthless. In Murray v. Barnhart2
the court
held that a one dollar consideration paid for a lease to drill in
one year was insufficient, and would be looked upon as no consideration at all. The same might be said for the purported consideration in the principal case. The vendor had no intention of
selling the minerals; the vendee had no reason to assume he was
buying them; no consideration was paid for them. Principles of
natural justice should demand that they remain vested in the
vendor. Although the requirement of an express reservation
should be rigidly enforced in cases involving acknowledgment
16. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1920); Wemple v. Nabors Oil and Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923); Lee
v. Glauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923).
17. Ibid.
18. Powell v. Roy, 14 La. App. 663, 130 So. 629 (1930); George v. Manhattan Land & Fruit Co., 51 F. (2d) 28 (C.C.A. 5th, 1931).
19. Sample v. Whitaker, 171 La. 949, 132 So. 511 (1930). See also Art. 805,
La. Civil Code of 1870.
20. Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906).
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of an existing mineral servitude, no such express reservation
should have been necessary to reserve title in the vendor in the
Herrick case.
E. L. L.

SALES-RESCISSION FOR MISREPRESENTATION-DUTY OF VENDEE
TO DISCLOSE VALUE-Action to recover possession of a diamond
ring, wherein one Sims, a negro, intervened, claiming ownership.
Sims found the ring and took it to a jewelry store, where the
plaintiff was employed. Upon examination of the ring, another
employee told Sims that the ring had bubbles in it; the employer
stated that it was not worth more than $130 and expressed a willingness to buy it for that sum. He apparently made a fruitless
effort to get the money. Sims was about to leave the store when
he was engaged in conversation by plaintiff, who had not theretofore participated in the meeting; plaintiff bought the ring for
$130. In reality it was worth $1,250. Held, the entire staff of the
jewelry store, including plaintiff, was in a fiduciary relationship
with Sims, and hence each member of the staff was under a duty
to disclose all he knew about the ring. Plaintiff was standing
nearby at the time and knew of the previous conversation. He
failed to disclose information which he was in justice bound to
reveal to the other party to the contract who was not on an
equal footing with him. Since the negro was led to believe that
the value of the ring was $130, he was thereby led into an error
of fact, which "comes under the head of" fraud, and the contract
should be rescinded. Grifilng v. Atkins, 1 So. (2d) 445 (La. App.
1941).
It is common knowledge that each party to a sales transaction will try to secure the greater advantage for himself and
drive the harder bargain. The law recognizes that in the haggling
of the marketplace some leeway from the standard of strict truth
must be allowed for "sales talk."1 This idea is epitomized in the
old expression, caveat emptor.2 On the other hand, courts are
unwilling to permit one party to take unfair advantage of the
other. Consequently, misrepresentation in order to secure a better deal will not be permitted in certain restricted cases where
1. Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (1933) 463, § 223; Anson, Principles of the Law of Contracts (1930) 249, § 210.
2. "Let the buyer beware." Black's Law Dictionary (1933) 294.

